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D uring the past 20 years, as world economic systems have become increasingly integrated and despite international action to reduce adverse environmental impacts, ecosystem degradation has worsened. Concomitantly, resource scarcity is beginning to be understood from an integrated perspective that moves beyond science to include the linked social-ecological aspects of such problems (Ostrom 1990) . Adaptive management, good governance, and other frameworks have also become increasingly influential outside of academia and are now found in policy documents produced by national governments and agencies (Staudinger et al. 2012) , nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international development groups (UN and ADB 2012) . Yet, many governments have been slow to embrace new perspectives on environmental problem-solving to manage resources in an adaptive, multilateral manner.
Over this same period, understanding of national security has also evolved. Since the 1990s, definitions have expanded from a narrow focus on maintaining state borders through military means to inclusion of non-traditional components, such as human well-being and resource scarcity, which are critical to security in an increasingly interdependent world (Brauch 2009; Dalby 2009) . Much debate has occurred over two questions: (1) whether increases in resource scarcity lead to interstate cooperation or conflict, and (2) whether it is appropriate to "securitize" environmental issues by adding them into discussions of state security. However, environmental security studies remain quite diverse, with multiple competing approaches and no consensus on precise definitions (see Floyd and Matthew 2013) . In this contested area, there is general agreement that environmental security analyses should examine threats -to individuals, communities, and nations -posed by environmental trends, and should look at how they may influence domestic and international political behavior. A major goal is to reduce risk and increase system resiliency (defined as the maintenance of critical ecological thresholds while supporting human capacity to adapt to ongoing change; Polasky et al. 2011) . Of course, adding human and environmental concerns into traditional definitions of security elevates the importance of complex social issues of vulnerability, adaptation, and justice (Adger 2010) . As these ongoing debates evolve, the concept of "security" in the 21st century, like resource "scarcity", continues to broaden and deepen. Yet, there remains limited conversation between three groups with a stake in security: natural scientists focused on environmental problems, social scientists and NGO staff working in REVIEWS REVIEWS REVIEWS
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In recent decades, perspectives on the integrated social-ecological aspects of natural resource problems have become increasingly influential as traditional national security outlooks have expanded to include environmental and human concerns. However, China has not been influenced much by new environmental security frameworks. An overview of six main stressors -ecosystem degradation, food security, energy, water, urbanization, and climate change -that affect security in China reveals that current policies need to be reformed. China's ecosystems remain subject to widespread degradation, food supply is under stress, energy demand is growing rapidly, there are increasing conflicts over water quality and quantity, urbanization cannot proceed without fundamental environmental and social reforms, and climate-change impacts are projected to intensify. To resolve such security issues, China's leaders must depend less on technological solutions and should instead craft adaptive management reforms to address the lack of interdisciplinary problem-solving, low institutional capacity, and gaps between policy and implementation. 
In a nutshell:
• After decades of rapid economic growth, major stressorsecosystem degradation, food, energy, water issues, urbanization, and climate change -are reducing social-ecological resiliency within China and across its borders • Despite growing international attention to environmental security (ie how environmental problems influence relations between nation states), the Chinese Government still applies a traditional security framework to domestic concerns and transboundary resource issues • In addition to poor institutional coordination and limited policy implementation, China currently has weak adaptive capacity to confront environmental security problems due to a lack of open information exchange and government transparency • China can strengthen its environmental security by crafting new political incentives for local officials, integrating rural-urban planning, and increasing its commitment to multilateral leadership on regional and global environmental problems n China and environmental security
Despite much international discussion, little has been written about environmental security in China. Although general aspects of environmental security have been discussed (Grumbine 2007; He et al. 2007; Morton 2008; Schreurs 2009 ), many researchers approach the topic through expansion from an international relations perspective that does not address environmental problems in detail (see Carlson 2010; Bisely 2012; Zhang and Zheng 2012) . Even though China has made important commitments to reduce the intensity of its atmospheric carbon (C) emissions, increase its reliance on alternative energy sources, and expand forest cover within its borders, the state still subsumes environmental problems under a traditional development framework where the economy is prioritized. Beijing's "security identity" continues to rest on centralized control of economic expansion to maintain a stable regional environment that enables such growth (Ogden 2013) . Beyond the contribution of Liu and Raven (2010) , who examined the potential cumulative consequences of pressures across China's social-ecological systems with little mention of politics, there have been few attempts to investigate links between domestic environmental drivers and regional security. What is needed is an assessment of critical environmental security issues that are increasing risks and reducing resiliency within China, and influencing geopolitics beyond its borders.
In this paper, I identify six stressors -ecosystem degradation, food, energy, water issues, urbanization, and climate change -that influence domestic and regional environmental security for China. Using Loring et al.'s (2013) general environmental security framework (modified for China), I highlight links between these stressors. Finally, I focus on how institutional issues in China act as barriers to security and demonstrate how adaptive management and governance offer solutions. I do not provide a quantitative assessment of relative or cumulative impacts; data and models to do so are not available. Given these limitations, my goals are to:
(1) assemble current data from a wide range of sources to draw attention to specific drivers and linkages that most influence environmental security in China; (2) spotlight critical gaps in institutional capacity, recommending actions that may assist Chinese leaders in reframing and strengthening the country's response to environmental security issues; and (3) stimulate cross-fertilization of ideas between researchers working on environmental and developmentrelated issues and scholars of international relations-driven security.
n Reducing environmental security: drivers of change The six social-ecological drivers discussed below are not unique to China; they have general influence on environmental security in many places. In China, both researchers and the central government concentrate on these six as key components that are driving change. For each driver, I highlight current trends using the most recent data and discuss links between drivers.
Ecosystem degradation
China's species and ecosystems remain subject to continuing degradation; habitat loss is ongoing across many terrestrial ecosystems (Lü et al. 2011) . For example, while the central government has allocated billions of renminbi (¥) for reforestation, data from the State Forestry Administration indicate that ~71% of new forests are plantations composed of mostly non-native species (Yang 2014) , with reduced ecological functioning. Despite expanding forest cover, habitat fragmentation is increasing ( Figure 1 ; Xu et al. 2014) . There are also unabated reductions in the extent of wetlands and intertidal ecosystems (MacKinnon et al. 2012 ) and, in the absence of adequate marine protection laws, coastal pollution has doubled since 2009. Habitat degradation in China is reducing the delivery of ecosystem services that people need.
Food security
China faces food security challenges as growth in demand outpaces supply and loss of arable land continues. Morton (2012) set the amount of arable land at 121.7 million ha as of 2007, but with rapid urbanization and resulting financial incentives to develop farmland, there is no definitive accounting. Other factors contributing to China's increasing food insecurity include unsustainable pumping of groundwater in the country's breadbasket, the North China Plain (Cao et al. 2013) , and uncontrolled soil pollution (Zheng 2014) . China may acquire some security benefits from importation of foods and their "virtual" water since domestic sources were not used to produce them, but given its expanding presence in global food markets and the potential scale of its future needs, the country's continued food supply is uncertain.
Energy security
Energy security -where supplies are uninterrupted, amounts are adequate, and costs are reasonable -is critical to any country's stability. However, energy supplies, costs, and demand in China are changing dramatically. Between 2013 and 2030, for example, growth in electricity demand in China is projected to be greater than current consumption in the US and Japan combined (IEA 2012).
To meet demand, the central government is expanding production across all energy sectors. In 2013, coal accounted for ~66% of China's "energy mix" (Xinhua 2014a) . Although coal use is slowing and coal is being burned more efficiently, total new fossil-fuel capacity added in 2013 was ~25% greater than all other sources of energy combined, and most forecasts project coal to remain dominant through 2030 (Plumer 2014) . Despite current government policy, increases in absolute carbon dioxide emissions will likely spur greater domestic and global environmental security impacts.
Other energy sources also have associated security concerns. According to the State Council, China's dependency on imported petroleum is projected to increase from 60% in 2014 to ~75% by 2030 (Xinhua 2014b) . Nuclear power contributes only 1.8% to China's current energy portfolio. However, similar to its dependence on foreign oil, the country is increasingly dependent on uranium fuel imports, given that it currently produces less than onetenth of the supply that it needs (Basov 2013) . While China is a world leader in adding renewable energy into its energy mix, most of this comes from dams. In 2013, hydropower supplied ~22% of China's energy . Current plans call for a 50% increase in generation capacity by 2020, but this will exacerbate concerns over the absence of cumulative environmental impact assessments for cascades of dams on multiple rivers (Figure 2 ), projects constructed in active seismic zones, and a host of unaddressed regional downstream transboundary river impacts (Grumbine et al. 2012) .
Water
China faces daunting freshwater quantity and quality issues. By 2030, total water demand is projected to outpace supply by 25% (Addams et al. 2009 ). This disparity results from inefficient agricultural use, rapidly growing industrial and urban demand, and wide gaps between central government water management mandates and local implementation. Water quality exacerbates water quantity issues. Studies show that ~43% of the country's surface water is unusable; furthermore, because of negligible water monitoring in rural areas and in the absence of any urban groundwater quality law, the Ministry of Environmental Protection reported in 2014 that ~280 million Chinese are drinking unsafe water (Xinhua 2014c) .
Urbanization
Complex social stresses interact with biophysical trends to influence domestic environmental security in China.
The key example is rapid urbanization. As a result of continuing rural-urban migration, Chinese cities are projected to grow by some 100 million new residents (the equivalent of ~33% of the US population) during the next 7 years (Figure 3; Xinhua 2014d ). Many trade-offs accompany China's rural-urban shift, with two groups driving security concerns: the urban middle class and migrant workers. Although urban Chinese use more water and energy and buy more cars than their rural (Zhang and Lin 2012) , the state's goal is to unleash domestic consumption to bolster its export-led economy. By 2020, projections call for a doubling of the middle class to ~400 million people, thus exerting additional purchasing power pressure on natural resources. Most Chinese, however, will not yet be part of the middle class by 2020. For example, there are now ~269 million migrant workers (~20% of China's population) living in urban areas (Xinhua 2014d) . But the governmentimposed hukuo (household registration) system strictly limits these citizens' access to education, housing, health insurance, and other social benefits. This group is so large that if benefits were extended to them in the near term, many Chinese municipalities would go bankrupt. Yet sustainable urbanization cannot proceed without giving migrants a more equal stake in society.
Climate change
Climate-change impacts in China are already apparent and projected to escalate over the 21st century. Extreme events (eg fire, drought, floods) are increasing in number, with accompanying reductions in ecosystem productivity and C sequestration. Despite uncertainty in model projections due to complex interactions between supply, price, utilization, and the effects of C fertilization, food insecurity in China will likely be exacerbated by climate change (Ye et al. 2012) . For water resources, the Asian monsoon appears to be weakening and many glaciers in western China are losing mass (Hijoka et al. 2014) . For energy, the key issue is C emissions. To have a reasonable chance of avoiding "dangerous climate change" above 2˚C, global emissions likely must peak bỹ 2020 (Arnell et al. 2013) . But while China's progressive climate policy calls for a cap on C emissions by 2020, there may be no absolute reduction until 2025 (Jiang et al. 2013). n Links between environmental security drivers
In their recent general framing of environmental security, Loring et al. (2013) emphasized social-ecological links that influence security and noted that these connections remain understudied. For China, I have modified this framework by adjusting the biophysical drivers of change, adding urbanization and governance to their socioeconomic drivers, and inserting climate change as a fourth security factor (Figure 4 ). An exhaustive accounting of links between drivers that affect China's environmental security is beyond the scope of this paper; instead I highlight the most important emerging issues with security consequences. With land degradation in China resulting in alterations to ecosystem structure and function, provisioning services that people depend on -clean air and water, hydrological and nutrient cycles, and environmental flows -are under more stress. This is especially evident on the Tibetan Plateau where human land-use change and climate change are triggering potential regime shifts from grasslands to shrublands, as well as reductions in wetland water storage capacity (Xu and Grumbine in press). Because China's natural resource base cannot meet growing domestic demand spurred by rapid urbanization, extraction pressures on global resources are increasing.
Food, energy, water, and urbanization are linked in multiple ways. There are growing conflicts over redistribution of water between ecosystems, agriculture, energy, and urban uses. Increased demands for cropland irrigation, urban wastewater treatment, and trans-shipment of water from places of greater to lesser supply will result in higher energy use and costs. While helping to reduce C emissions, hydropower development is altering transboundary flows that may diminish food security among downstream nations (Wang et al. 2014) . The government's new energy plan includes coal reduction and water-saving targets for eastern China but fails to limit the importation of "dirty"fuels-based energy from sources in western China (Stanway 2013) .
Urbanization links with other security drivers as it is set to drive growth in China for decades to come. Building new cities for 100 million people in 7 years, in combination with the goal of increasing domestic consumption, will add stress across all of China's systems. Many firsttime urbanites will live in new cities that will probably be built on arable land. Even if the new leadership's urbanization plan proceeds as intended, the government will be challenged to manage social pressures because, after 2020, 55% of city dwellers will still have unequal access to basic social services (Xinhua 2014d) .
From a security standpoint, climate change acts as a "threat multiplier" on all of the above drivers. Efforts to solve energy supply problems by converting coal to natural gas and other fuels are ramping up emissions, water supply risks, and social dislocations (Kelly 2014) . Without better implementation of city planning, large-scale urbanization will likely boost China's C footprint. Even notable growth in China's renewable energy output, absent crosssector coordination in government policy, is being offset by increasing emissions from other sectors (Qi et al. 2014) .
Overall, despite efforts by the central government, data on drivers and their linkages indicate general declines in systems' resiliency and increasing security risks. Beijing has responded with policies that are primarily science-and technology-based, yet data here portray a collective set of issues that are complex, cross-cutting, and difficult to resolve through technological fixes (Howes and Wyrwoll 2012) . The question is: what can China do?
n Adaptive problem-solving for environmental security To strengthen environmental security, China must address three major problems. First, after 30 years of rapid growth in gross domestic product relative to that of other countries, China's linked ecological and social debts are coming due concurrently. Second, timing is becoming critical. For example, because groundwater quality will not be fully monitored until 2020, pollution of drinking water sources will continue in the short term. Finally, issues of timing and implementation are related to institutional capacity, which represents China's third and most challenging macro-security problem. The adaptive management and governance behaviors highlighted repeatedly in the academic literature (see Lemos et al. 2013 ) and policy documents (Lee et al. 2012; UN and ADB 2012) include:
(1) open information exchange, (2) government transparency, (3) institutional coordination, (4) iterative decision making, (5) multi-stakeholder participation, and (6) conflict resolution capacity.
Measured by the above standards, China, which is known for its top-down, command-and-control decision making, currently has weak adaptive capacity to solve complex, cross-sector environmental security problems. Leaders, for instance, often do not recognize the role that people play in linked social-ecological systems. Nevertheless, the international consensus is that governments that can implement adaptive management will likely be more successful at increasing state and system resilience to future change. To build greater institutional adaptive capacity to address security concerns, I offer the following recommendations.
China has adequate ecosystem protection laws on paper, but rule-of-law-based implementation remains challenging . Environmental impact assessment reforms should eliminate developer-funded studies, include cumulative impact reviews of neighboring projects (eg cascades of dams on one river), reduce the use of inaccurate data, and strengthen implementation of public information disclosure. After the new leadership's Fall 2013 administrative and policy reforms, the state has the opportunity to begin to use integrated decision making to incorporate ecosystem protection across water, food, and energy planning (Grumbine 2013) . Building on such domestic experience and using its scientific capabilities, the Chinese Government could exert leadership and begin to collaborate with neighboring countries to evaluate regional ecosystem degradation and its security implications.
China is making substantial progress on food security through technical solutions (eg introducing droughtresistant crop varieties; Zhang et al. 2013 ), but institutional barriers remain unaddressed. Improving production efficiencies will "create" more food, but with agricultural self-sufficiency no longer possible for China, an adaptive strategy would be to expand cross-institutional coordination that links domestic and international food security policies. If central government leaders can create a unified domestic land market that combines Loring et al. [2013] , with permission of J Agr Food Sys Comm Dev [www.agdevjournal.com] ). stronger and more flexible use rights for farmers with new tax policies, then pressure on domestic arable land and global food systems may decrease.
China's energy security not only involves adding supplies but also encompasses new political reforms. Reducing demand can be accomplished most efficiently by targeting energy efficiency in new promotion incentives for local officials. Use of adaptive scenario building could give government leaders a greater range of choices to better capture trade-offs between energy policy options. At the international level, energy security would be enhanced if China -the world's largest consumer of energy and emitter of greenhouse gases -were to be admitted into the International Energy Agency.
China's domestic water security depends on improving government transparency around the implementation of existing water laws; forging new water management links between provinces and bureaus within river basins; and encouraging more planning participation from citizens, NGOs, and businesses. Regional environmental security on China's transboundary rivers will grow if basin-wide management is adopted and anchored on open information and deliberative exchange between China and its neighbors . Such an outcome would help China to craft more adaptive solutions before scarcity-driven crises require action.
With hundreds of millions of people moving to cities during the next several decades, ecosystems, agriculture, energy, and water production will all be affected in unpredictable ways. Yet this trend provides opportunities to initiate adaptive planning between urban and rural China. Chinese leaders recognize that urban and rural futures are inextricably linked. But it is unclear whether provincial and local officials will expand their concept of social development away from a narrow focus on city-led economic growth. For a new kind of urbanization to succeed, local leaders must design city clusters blended with surrounding peri-urban and rural lands, integrate transport systems, initiate material flows and life-cycle analyses for green building construction, and push hukuo reform to provide more social benefits sooner to the majority of urban Chinese (UNEP 2013) . Given data that illustrate important links between energy efficiency and reducing C emissions (Morales 2014) , Chinese planners must overcome governance stumbling blocks that have heretofore undermined urbanization efficiency by crafting specific targets and implementing measurable indicators of progress (Liu et al. 2014) .
As urbanization prompts leaders to adopt more integrated planning, climate change also provides an opportunity for the state to strengthen security by exerting policy leadership. China's current climate policy needs to become more adaptive. Currently, policies are built on the fact that the country's per capita emissions have always been far below those of developed countries. But this is changing rapidly; if current trends continue, Chinese per capita emissions, already on par with those of the European Union (EU), will approach US per capita emissions by ~2020 (Le Quéré et al. 2013) . With global negotiations stalled, the Chinese Government can strengthen domestic responses to climate impacts. One example, given the scale of potential impacts of sea-level rise on China's eastern seaports and current lack of local government awareness, would be to promote more local-regional information exchange and coordinated mitigation planning (Jin and Hermi 2013).
n Institutional reform and environmental security
With the central government's sweeping policy reforms announced at the end of 2013, China's new leaders appear committed to change and are increasing funding for multiple environmental initiatives. But without strong rule of law, more money translates into more politics; Financial Ministry data show that overall environmental funding decreased in 2013 (Lin 2014) . Greater expenditures, while necessary, do not resolve fundamental issues of weak political coordination and poor implementation. These are governance issues, and leaders must abandon their historical preference for sector-by-sector policy making. Instead, they must learn to grapple with institutional coordination and the reframing of "security" by considering how the adaptive behaviors highlighted above might benefit state stability. In domestic affairs, will new incentives stimulate more internal cross-ministerial and central-local government coordination? Along with more funding and infrastructure, how might new urbanization mandates be crafted to facilitate sustainable urban-rural flows of capital and resources? How can leaders act to ensure policy implementation given the gaps between central government directives and local government incentives for action?
For regional environmental security issues (water, energy, climate), there is the danger that China will continue to look inward and see its domestic environmental security enhanced by developing shared transboundary resources without consideration of regional downstream impacts ( Figure 5 ). However, as measured by Asia's accelerating arms race (IISS 2013), neighboring countries not only are interested in economic partnerships with China but also seek broader security assurances. Increasing regional cross-border flows of goods, people, information, and capital will continue to propel China (and all Asian states) toward the realization that when security is embedded in shared natural and human resources, it cannot be managed without some level of collective action. This is the core security issue in China and the region, given the prevalence of relatively closed systems of government coupled with pressures growing out of the frenetic pace of change. Although adaptive management is difficult to implement even in developed nations that are generally supportive of such practices (Bauer et al. 2012) , an alternative for dealing with growing resource and societal insecurity has not emerged. Closed information, less transparency, inefficient institutional coordination, reduced participation from those people most affected by decisions -these choices do not make sense when addressing the environmental and social drivers that are shaping security in today's world. The question becomes not if but when will China embark upon a more adaptive management path. Now is the time for China to provide leadership to strengthen its domestic and regional security by initiating cooperative multilateral institution-building on a host of environmental issues, including transboundary river management, energy infrastructure, and South China Sea resources. Unlike "integrated", "transboundary", and other approaches to problem-solving, the concept of security has immediate gravitas for nation states; it catches the attention of leaders concerned with maintaining stability and power. Environmental security may provide a more legitimate path toward including non-traditional ecological and social perspectives into government planning. Although China's current government system is not an obvious candidate for adaptive governance (Grumbine and Xu 2013) , Chinese leaders already have some experience promulgating open information, public participation, and corporate responsibility on environmental issues through partnership with the EU (see www.ecegp.com/index_en.asp#).
Adaptive management and governance in China may already be succeeding. In early 2014, the Party chief of Yunnan province, China's most biologically diverse area and a critical part of the transboundary Mekong River basin, outlined a program of environmental and social policy reforms containing adaptive management elements (Quin 2014) . Moreover, China's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs recently spoke about a new security architecture based on some of the fundamentals of adaptive governance, including building "consensus" and "functional cooperation to accumulate mutual understanding and trust" (Liu 2013) .
China has already demonstrated itself to the world as a remarkable example of economic transformation and human development. However, it is easier to build a powerhouse economy riding the crest of late 20th-century globalization than it is to construct an adaptive state under 21st-century conditions of dwindling resources and increasing uncertainty. Given China's growing impacts on global systems, the stakes are high. The country now confronts an old challenge: escaping the leadership's historical tendency toward technological lock-in, where maintaining the status quo is perceived to be less costly than forging new directions for development (Elvin 1993) . However, in the fast-changing Asia of the 21st century -with continuing global market integration, private sector funding of public infrastructure, rapid information exchange, and social network organizing along with increases in climate-driven extreme events -the last thing that is static is security. If China can remake its economy, recalibrate its environmental policies, and reform its institutions and governance, the country will be better positioned for long-term sustainable development. As outlined here, China can use an adaptive framework for environmental security to broaden its definition of national "self interest" and deepen its commitment to multilateral leadership. If the state is successful, it will have moved closer toward the security that it seeks.
n References Addams L, Boccaletti G, Kerlin M, and Stuchtey M. 2009. Charting our water future: economic frameworks to inform decision-making. The 2030 Water Resources Group. www. Figure 5 . The Mekong River is shared among six countries; China has so far opted out of formal participation in transboundary river management.
